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LEGAL ASPECTS OF A FEDERAL WATER 
QUALITY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 
Jon T. Brown* 
and 
Wallace L. Duncan** 
0 NE of the major problems in controlling water pollution is the collection of data to measure pollution and to identify 
polluters. Existing law is relatively silent on this important matter. 
For example, in abatement proceedings under the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act,1 it must be shown that the pollution has reduced 
water quality below the standards established under that Act.2 But 
the Act is largely silent as to how specific evidence of such pollution 
is to be obtained. In many cases, that evidence may be gathered 
from the data that have been disclosed by the polluter in a report 
the preparation and filing of which have been requested by the 
Secretary of the Interior.3 In any case, however, initial detection of 
pollution and identification of the polluter must first have been 
accomplished either by state or local governments-by means that 
remain unspecified by the statute4-or, in certain cases, by the Sec-
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1. 62 Stat. ll55 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), as amended, National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, Water Quality Improvement 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. 
2. See 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), which provides for the states to 
establish standards for water quality. 
3. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(k)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) provides that the Secretary, if so 
requested by a conference of state and interstate water pollution agencies, may require 
an alleged polluter to file a report "based on existing data, furnishing such information 
as may reasonably be requested as to the character, kind, and quantity of such dis-
charges and the use of facilities or other means to prevent or reduce such discharges 
by the person filing such a report." 
4. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) requires the Secretary to convene a 
conference of pollution agencies when so requested by a state governor, but the statute 
is silent with respect to the means by which the governor is to have learned of the 
pollution and of suspected polluters. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) provides 
for the development of water quality standards, but is similarly silent with respect to 
the means by which adherence to those standards is to be determined. 
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retary on the basis of "reports, surveys, or studies.''5 Since such de-
tection and identification are crucial to the effective enforcement of 
the water quality standards, adequate means for collecting data re-
lating to water quality should be established. 
Collection of water quality data is also important for the purpose 
of determining the present and future needs for water resources and 
for the purpose of determining the proper allocation of limited finan-
cial resources among those needs. In addition, such data are neces-
sary in order to conduct research studies and in order to determine 
water quality trends for the purposes of long-range planning. 
Perhaps the best way to collect such data would be to establish 
a national surveillance system designed to monitor the quality of the 
nation's water resources. Such a national system is currently under 
consideration by the Federal Water Quality Administration.6 That 
system would involve the use of contemporary scientific data-gather-
ing devices and telemetering equipment. Essentially, the system 
would consist of a series of surveillance stations located at various 
points along rivers and streams and at the edges of lakes and reser-
voirs. These stations would utilize automatic sampling and data-
gathering equipment to monitor water quality, and would transmit 
the resulting information by automatic telemetering devices to cen-
tral data banks for observation and analysis. Much of the scientific 
equipment necessary for such a system is fully developed and would 
require only minor modifications in order to operate effectively in 
the surveillance system. Other equipment might require further de-
velopment before reaching an acceptable level of reliability and 
accuracy; but the technology for that development is available, and 
there is little doubt that such a surveillance system can be developed 
if the Government is prepared to move in that direction. It is the 
purpose of this Article to examine the legal mechanisms necessary for 
the establishment of such a system, to determine the extent to which 
existing laws can be used to that end, and to point out the areas 
in which some congressional action may be necessary in order to 
complete the legal foundation for a national water quality surveil-
lance program. 
5. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) permits the Secretary to initiate a con• 
ference even when not requested by a state government, but only when he has reason 
to believe, on the basis of reports, surveys, or studies, that pollution is occuring which 
is "endangering the health or welfare of persons in a State other than that in which 
the discharge or discharges originate • • ." or that substantial economic injury is 
resulting from the inability, due to the pollution, to market shellfish in interstate 
commerce. 
6. A comprehensive study and proposal has been submitted by Cyrus Wm. Rice &: 
Company, Pittsburgh, Pa. 
May 1970] Water Quality Surveillance 1133 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL WATER QUALITY SURVEILLANCE 
SYSTEM 
The threshold question in the establishment of a federal water 
quality surveillance system is whether there is adequate authority for 
creation of such a system. The necessary authority must be found 
both in the Constitution and in statutes. An initial requirement, 
then, is that the rivers and streams which are to be monitored be of 
a type over which the United States is empowered by the Constitution 
to exercise its authority. In order to comply with the traditional 
requirements of the commerce clause, congressional power respecting 
rivers and streams may reach only those rivers and streams which are 
either "navigable" or "interstate."7 
The judicial definition of "navigability" has not remained con-
stant, although its general parameters were set out in the late nine-
teenth century in the case of The Daniel Ball.8 In that case the 
Court held that streams are "public navigable rivers in law which 
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are 
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, 
as highways of commerce."9 According to subsequent interpretations 
of Daniel Ball, a stream is navigable in full if it is navigable in 
part,10 and it remains navigable even if no longer subject to com-
mercial use.11 In United States v. Appalachian Power Company,12 
decided in 1940, the definition of navigability was broadened to in-
clude those streams which are potentially susceptible of navigation. 
Finally, in United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,13 a 1960 
case, the Supreme Court determined that nonnavigable tributaries 
7. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824); 33 U.S.C. § 466g(a) (Supp. 
IV, 1965-1968). On the other hand, it may not be necessary to limit constitutional 
authority to the "navigable" and "interstate" streams. If the question is simply whether 
there is constitutional authority to establish a surveillance system, the United States 
could actually establish stations even in streams that are not navigable or interstate, 
on the ground that polluters, wherever located, are subject to regulation under the 
commerce power, if their activities-that is, their products-affect commerce. Under 
this approach, it would not be necessary that pollution reach interstate or navigable 
waters, but only that products of polluters affect commerce. Such an effect upon 
commerce might arise from the fact that if polluters on intrastate, nonnavigable 
streams are not subject to regulation, their products in interstate commerce might 
gain a competitive advantage over those of companies which, by virtue of plant loca-
tion, are subject to pollution standards. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
8. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). 
9. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563. 
10. United States v. Rio Grande Dam &: Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
11. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). 
12. 311 U.S. 377. 
13. 363 U.S. 299. 
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of navigable streams may be subject to the commerce power of Con-
gress as long as the main stream is "navigable" under the traditional 
definitions. 
With respect to the second constitutional criterion £or federal 
authority-whether streams or rivers are "interstate" in nature14-
the position of the Government as reflected in statute is that "inter-
state waters" consist of "all rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow 
across, or form a part of boundaries between two or more states."1" 
Thus, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act does not apply to 
waters which are wholly within a single state, nor does it apply 
directly to waters which are merely tributaries of interstate waters. 
But the term "interstate" has been construed by the Department of 
the Interior to mean that if a body of water is interstate at any point, 
the entire body of water is thereby interstate and subject to the 
federal statute.16 Moreover, although tributaries may not be directly 
subject to the Federal Act, nevertheless if any matter discharged into 
such tributaries reaches interstate waters and reduces the quality of 
such interstate waters below established standards, the pollution is 
subject to abatement under the Act.17 
It is clear from the Supreme Court's decisions respecting navigable 
waters, and to a lesser extent, from the congressional and admini-
strative declarations respecting interstate waters, that the number of 
streams over which the federal power may constitutionally extend 
is immense. Only on the smallest of streams in a river basin would the 
exercise of federal authority be questionable. Whether the potential 
authority will be exercised, however, is another question, since the 
implementation of that authority has been slow to develop, as may 
be seen in the history of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act.18 Hence, an evaluation of the possibilities £or establishing a 
surveillance system requires an examination of the existing statutory 
framework relating to water pollution. 
14. The "interstate" criterion for federal authority seems to stem from the "navi-
gability" definition of The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (IS70), discussed in text 
accompanying notes 8-11 supra. Since "navigable" waters are those susceptible of use 
in "commerce," and since that case's reference to "commerce" is to interstate commerce, 
it seems that for federal authority to apply, waters must be "interstate" as well as "nav-
igable." But for the contrary view-that federal authority need not be so limited-
see note 7 supra. 
15. 33 U.S.C. § 466j(e) (1964). 
16. U.S. DEPT. OF TilE INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR EsrABLISHING '\TATER. QUALITY 
STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE WATERS 10-11 (1966) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. 
17. 33 u.s.c. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. I, 1965); GUIDELINES 60. 
18. See Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 
68 MICH. L. REv. 1103 (1970). 
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That framework is provided by the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act.19 That Act, a compendium of original and amendatory 
legislation, stems from legislation passed in 1948.20 It has since been 
modified and strengthened by the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1956,21 the amendments of 1961,22 the Water 
Quality Act of 1965,23 and the Clean Water Restoration Act of 
1966.24 Additional amendments were recently added by the Water 
Quality Improvement Act of 1970,25 which was signed by President 
Nixon on April 3, 1970. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is a product both of 
the necessity to halt the destruction of the nation's water resources 
and of the reality of countervailing federal, state, and industrial 
powers. Like many pieces of legislation, its goals tend to outstrip its 
tools for implementation. The entire Act, but particularly its en-
forcement sections, provides only limited federal authority and often 
authorizes such authority solely as a last resort.26 Instead, it encour-
ages cooperation between federal and state authorities and in some 
instances requires such cooperation.27 Because of this tangled thicket 
of compromise and accommodation, it is understandable that the 
lines of authority between federal and state governments are not 
clearly drawn in the Act.28 Moreover, in view of the apparent con-
gressional concern for reconciling the interests of conflicting parties, 
19. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), as amended, National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, Water Quality Improvement 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. 
20. 62 Stat. 1155. 
21. 70 Stat. 498. 
22. 75 Stat. 204. 
23. 79 Stat. 903. 
24. 80 Stat. 1247. 
25. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. 
26. See generally Barry, supra note 18. 
27. This tone of compromise is established in § I of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466 
(1964), in which it is provided: 
In connection with the exercise of jurisdiction over the waterways of the Nation 
and in consequence of the benefits resulting to the public health and welfare by 
the prevention and control of water pollution, it is hereby declared to be the 
policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities 
and rights of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution, to support 
and aid technical research relating to the prevention and control of water pol-
lution, and to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to State and 
interstate agencies and to municipalities in connection with the prevention and 
control of water pollution. 
At face value, this policy statement tends to vest enforcement activities primarily in 
the states, while affording the federal government a role generally limited to research 
and assistance. See also 33 U.S.C. § 466a(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); 33 U.S.C. §§ 466c(a), 
(c) (1964); 33 U.S.C. § 466g(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
28. Barry, supra note 18, at UIS. 
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rather than for halting pollution, it is not surprising that the Act 
fails to provide specifically for the establishment of a national water 
quality surveillance system. Since such a system is neither expres~ly 
prohibited nor expressly authorized by the Act. The following dis-
cussion will examine those aspects of the Act and its administration 
from which the authority for a surveillance system may be drawn. 
Section 3(a) of the Act provides that the Secretary of the Interior 
shall 
prepare or develop comprehensive programs for eliminating or re-
ducing the pollution of interstate waters and tributaries thereof 
and improving the sanitary condition of surface and underground 
waters .... For the purpose of this section, the Secretary is 
authorized to make joint investigations with any [federal, state, or 
interstate] agencies of the condition of any waters in any State or 
States, and of the discharges of any sewage, industrial waters, or sub-
stance which may adversely affect such waters.29 
It appears reasonable to conclude that the "joint investigations" 
authorized by section 3(a) might comprehend the establishment of a 
water quality surveillance system. Furthermore, the "comprehensive 
programs" to be developed as a result of those "joint investigations" 
could likewise include the designated programs and purposes of a 
water quality surveillance system. 
Several other provisions of the Act support this conclusion. Sec-
tion 5(a), for example, provides that the Secretary of the Interior 
"shall conduct ... research, investigations, experiments, demonstra-
tions, and studies relating to the causes, control, and prevention of 
water pollution."30 Section 5(b) allows the Secretary to conduct in-
vestigations, at the request of state or interstate agencies, on specific 
pollution problems.31 Section IO(d) contemplates that the Secretary 
may initiate enforcement procedures on the basis of "reports, surveys, 
or studies,"32 and section 5(c) requires that the Secretary, in coopera-
tion with federal, state, and interstate agencies, "collect and dis-
seminate basic data on chemical, physical, and biological water 
quality and other information insofar as such data or other infor-
mation relate to water pollution and the prevention and control 
thereof."33 Further support is gained from section 5(e), which author-
izes the Secretary to establish, equip, and maintain field laboratory 
29. 33 U.S.C. § 466a(a) (1964). 
30. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(a) (1964). 
31. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(b) (1964). 
32. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
33. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(c) (1964). 
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and research facilities,34 and from section 5(d)(B), which authorizes 
the Secretary to develop and demonstrate methods for identifying 
and measuring the effect of pollutants on water uses.35 The 1970 Act 
bolsters the conclusion that there exists authority for the establish-
ment of a water quality surveillance system; it authorizes the Sec-
retary to acquire land for demonstration projects and for the develop-
ment of field laboratories and research facilities.36 
On the basis of these representative provisions of the Act, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Congress has, however inexplicitly, au-
thorized a national system for monitoring water quality. This con-
clusion is confirmed by the fact that the federal government is given 
a major responsibility for enforcing the water quality standards 
established under the Act; and without the necessary means for de-
termining violations, such as a surveillance system, enforcement 
must rest on mere conjecture.37 
Executive orders issued by the Office of the President furnish 
additional support for the proposition that a surveillance system may 
be established under existing law. For example, section 3 of Execu-
tive Order 11,507 relating to pollution caused by federal facilities, 
requires agency heads to "[m]aintain review and surveillance to en-
sure that [water quality standards] are met on a continuing basis."38 
This executive order thus seems to contemplate the establishment of 
a continuing system for monitoring the discharge of pollutants from 
federal installations, although it fails to elaborate on the particulars 
of such a system. Without a system of surveillance, it would be im-
possible "to ensure that [pollution control] standards are met on a 
continuing basis."39 
The executive order's authorization seems to aim at surveillance 
of pollution only from federal or federally related activities. But 
pollution, unlike politics, does not abide by the federal system or 
adhere to the theories of states' rights. In many situations it would be 
impossible for a surveillance system to monitor only those pollutants 
that come from federal sources, and it would be irrational to attempt 
such an approach. It is likely, therefore, that any surveillance system 
established under Executive Order 11,507 to monitor pollution from 
34. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(e) (1964). 
35. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(d)(B) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
36. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 105(2), 84 Stat. 
91 (1970). See note 118 infra and accompanying text. 
37. See 33 U.S.C. § 466g(a) (1964), which provides for abatement, but makes no 
provision for detecting that which is to be abated. 
38. Exec. Order No. 11,507, § 3(a)(l), 35 Fed. Reg. 2573 (1970). 
39. Id. 
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federal sources could also be used successfully to monitor pollution 
from other sources, whether state, municipal, or private, particularly 
since the activities of the federal government are so extensive that 
even a system which sought to monitor only those activities would 
have to be a highly comprehensive one in order to be effective. 
In view of the interplay among the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, the administrative regulations issued thereunder, and the 
provisions of Executive Order 11,507, and in light of the interrelated 
nature of the problems of water pollution, it seems probable that the 
federal government has the authority under existing law to proceed 
with the establishment of a federal water quality surveillance system. 
To the extent that such authority is not clear, however, it may be 
desirable to define it by means of a statute such as that set out in the 
Appendix to this Article.40 
I£ establishment of a surveillance system is to be sought under 
existing law, however, the question arises whether a comprehensive 
surveillance system could feasibly be established and operated ex-
clusively by the federal government, or whether the participation of 
state and interstate agencies is imperative. The Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act is, in general, quite protective of the interests of 
the states. Section 1 of that Act declares it "to be the policy of 
Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibili-
ties and rights of the States in preventing and controlling water 
pollution .... "41 In establishing water quality standards under the 
Act, primary responsibility again lies with the states; and it is only 
after a state has failed to establish standards that the Secretary may 
act affirmatively.42 Similarly, in investigation and enforcement pro-
ceedings, great respect is accorded to the interests of the states. Inves-
tigations are to be conducted jointly with state and interstate 
agencies,43 and "state and interstate action to abate pollution of 
interstate or navigable waters shall be encouraged and shall not ... 
be displaced by Federal enforcement action."44 
It is difficult to conclude that Congress intended by those provi-
sions that the states, whether by lack of funds or by mere intransi-
gence, could thwart the investigations and programs necessary for the 
fulfillment of the purposes of the Act. Indeed, a judgment that the 
40. The proposed statute would not only explicitly authorize the establishment of 
a surveillance system, but would also provide an explicit means for acquiring the land 
for such a system. See pp. 1165-66 infra. 
41. 33 U.S.C. § 466(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See also note 27 supra. 
42. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
43. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
44. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See also 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(6) (Supp. 
IV, 1965-1968). 
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federal government is not so limited appears to underlie Secretary 
of the Interior Walter J. Hickel's establishment, in July 1969, of the 
Task Force on Pollution Enforcement. As a result of evidence 
gathered by federal monitoring activities,45 that Task Force, in 
September 1969, recommended the convening of hearings and the 
possible initiation of litigation to halt excessive pollution in certain 
areas of Kansas, Oklahoma, Ohio, and the Lake Erie Basin. In light 
of the initiative taken by the Secretary in establishing such a task 
force, it seems probable that the concern for state and interstate 
agencies, which is exhibited in the statute, means essentially that the 
federal government is directed to seek the cooperation of those agen-
cies, but may proceed independently if such cooperation is not 
offered. Consequently, it appears reasonable to conclude that the 
federal government may establish a surveillance system even without 
the joint participation of state and interstate agencies. 
On the other hand, the political problems in such an independent 
course of action could be severe, particularly since Congress has 
manifested a great sensitivity to states' rights in the area of pollution 
control. Yet, it is unlikely that the establishment of a federal water 
quality surveillance system would encounter the same resistance as 
have some other federal water resource projects, notably projects 
initiated by the Army Corps of Engineers.46 For one thing, unlike 
the reception that has been accorded to many federal water projects, 
there has been almost universal acceptance of the necessity for the 
control and abatement of water pollution and in light of the issue's 
current political popularity, political opposition is likely to be small. 
Second, a water quality surveillance system would not have the 
disruptive effect on local economies that large-scale resource projects 
often have. Finally, a federal system would alleviate the financial 
burden on the states in the area of surveillance activities. But, 
although the federal government may be able to proceed alone in 
establishing a surveillance system, the cooperation and joint par-
ticipation of state and interstate agencies should still be sought to 
45. Informal conversations with the Federal Water Quality Administration indicate 
that present monitoring activities are minimal. The Administration currently main-
tains approximately 400 surveillance sites, of which about 100 are fully automatic. The 
automatic sites, of course, maintain a continuous surveillance. At the manual sites, 
checking occurs from once every two weeks to once every month. The Federal Water 
Quality Administration also pays the Geological Survey to maintain approximately 460 
sites, of which 60 are automatic. 
46. An example is the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, a Corps project authorized in 
1942 as a wartime defense measure and not yet completed. Much opposition to the 
canal has been aroused in recent years. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Corps of Engrs., Civ. No. 2655-69 (D. D.C., second amended complaint filed April 9, 
1970); Drew, Dam Outrage: The Story of the Army Engineers, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
April 1970, at 51. 
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the fullest extent. Particularly if the system is to be established largely 
under existing law, efforts should be made to adhere to the coopera-
tive tone of present statutes; and if appropriations are likely to be a 
problem-as they invariably are-the costs of site acquisition and 
development may be significantly reduced through intergovernmental 
cooperation. 47 
Particularly important with respect to any cooperative efforts in 
developing a surveillance system are the interstate pollution control 
agencies. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act contemplated 
the creation of such bodies,48 and there now exist at least ten inter-
state compacts which deal directly with water pollution control prob-
lems. Of the compacts only two will be discussed in some detail here, 
since they are somewhat representative of the entire group. The Ohio 
River Valley Sanitation Compact (ORSANC0)49 encompasses the 
states of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia. The Tennessee River Basin Water 
Pollution Control Compact50 numbers among its signatories the 
states of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Virginia. Both compacts provide for the establish-
ment of interstate commissions; and in both cases the commissions 
are vested with certain regulatory functions, including the establish-
ment of water quality criteria. The federal government is represented 
by a delegate on the ORSANCO Commission, but not on the Ten-
nessee Commission. Neither commission is authorized to issue en-
forcement orders without a majority vote of the compact's com-
missioners. 
The jurisdiction of each commission in establishing water quality 
standards and issuing enforcement orders extends only to the waters 
in the interstate drainage basin with which the particular compact 
is concerned. Even that limited jurisdiction, however, enables the 
commissions, like the federal government, to establish water quality 
criteria for the entire breadth of a stream regardless of state bound-
aries. 51 Were it not for this authority, and the similar authority 
vested in the federal government, it is conceivable, indeed likely, 
that different criteria would apply on each side of a river which 
47. See text accompanying note 95 infra. 
48. 33 U.S.C. § 466b(b) (1964) grants congressional consent for states to enter inter-
state compacts, and to establish implementing administrative agencies, for cooperative 
efforts in the control of pollution; but it requires further congressional approval 
before any such compact becomes binding upon a party state. 
49. 54 Stat. 752 (1940). 
50. 72 Stat. 823 (1958). 
51. The standards will not, however, apply to the entire length of a stream unless 
the stream flows only through signatory states. 
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borders two states. Since both the federal government and the inter-
state-compact commissions may have authority over such interstate 
streams, any differences in criteria or standards which might other-
wise arise between states can be resolved. Indeed, the Federal Water 
Quality Administration has already undertaken to reconcile con-
flicting criteria submitted by states bordering several of the Great 
Lakes. 
The interstate-compact commissions seem to hold over their 
signatory states a power which is analogous to that of the federal 
government under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The 
ORSANCO Commission, for example, is authorized to investigate, 
study, and make recommendations concerning pollution problems 
within its jurisdiction, to advise local governments, to confer with 
other governments, and to draft and recommend remedial legisla-
tion. 52 With respect to the enforcement of water quality standards 
adopted by the commission, both the ORSANCO Commission and 
the Tennessee River Basin Commission are authorized to issue ad-
ministrative enforcement orders and to obtain in either the state or 
the federal courts orders for compliance. Finally, both compacts pro-
vide for mutual coordination in their operations. The Tennessee 
River Basin Commission Compact provides that it is not to conflict 
with the provisions of ORSANCO, but that the Commission is free 
to set more stringent standards for the signatory states than those 
provided by ORSANCO. The ORSANCO Compact has a similar 
provision. 
If the federal government decides to establish a national water 
quality surveillance system, the compact commissions, as well as the 
states, should be consulted regarding the operation of such a system. 
They should be encouraged to coordinate their own surveillance 
activities with those of the United States and should also be invited 
to participate in the system's operations to the greatest possible extent. 
II. ACQUISITION OF SITES FOR SURVEILLANCE STATIONS 
The success of any surveillance system will depend in large mea-
sure upon the acquisition of suitable sites for monitoring water 
quality. Basically, there are three methods by which site acquisition 
may be accomplished. First, it may be possible in some instances for 
the Government to establish sites, without compensating the owners 
of riparian land, by exercising the "navigation servitude." Second, 
it may be possible, at little or no acquisition cost, to establish stations 
on federal lands. Third, the Government may seek to acquire sites 
52. 3 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 341 (R. Clark ed. 1967). 
1142 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:1131 
for surveillance stations from state and local governments and from 
private owners. Significant legal problems may be encountered in all 
of these approaches to site acquisition, and in some cases the resolu-
tion of those problems may require the amendment of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. The following discussion examines the 
problems involved with each method of acquisition. 
A. Site Acquisition Under the Navigation Seroitude 
Certain types of surveillance stations will probably not require 
the use of lands which are situated above the high-water mark of a 
river. This is particularly true in cases in which it may be advan-
tageous to establish stations on pilings anchored below the high-water 
mark, and in cases in which it may be desirable to place sampling 
equipment-again anchored below the high-water mark-in such a 
manner as to transect the stream in order to obtain readings at 
various points of flow. In instances in which surveillance stations or 
equipment can be situated below the high-water marks on rivers or 
streams, it may be possible for the United States to exercise the 
"navigation servitude" vested in the federal government and thus 
to avoid incurring liability for the payment of compensation to the 
owners of private lands which are riparian to the streams. The 
navigation servitude, which is derived from the commerce clause 
of the United States Constitution, gives the federal government dom-
inant control of the stream bed of navigable waters up to the ordinary 
high-water mark.53 Title to any lands situated below that mark is 
thus subject to the dominant interest of the United States, and the 
land may be taken by the federal government without compensating 
the private landowners.54 
Under the traditional view, the right of the United States to take 
private lands without compensation seems to be limited to those 
situations in which the dominant interest is exercised in aid of 
navigation.55 Courts have recognized, however, that, so long as the 
interests of navigation are served, other purposes may be advanced 
as well.56 Thus, in order to justify site acquisition under this tradi-
tional view of the servitude, it is necessary to demonstrate that the 
establishment of surveillance stations would in fact aid navigation. 
Pollution, it may be argued, is a burden on navigation because it 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. &: P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941). 
54. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945). 
55. See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. &: P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941): 
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945): United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956). 
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increases the corrosion rate of vessels and buoys, makes navigation 
more difficult as a result of water-clouding, damages dock facilities, 
and has numerous other deleterious effects on navigation. Since the 
surveillance stations would be part of a program designed to elim-
inate pollution, then, they would aid navigation and thus allow the 
servitude to be used for the traditional purpose of assisting nav-
igation. 
The major advantage of the argument based upon the traditional 
view of the servitude is the fact that the courts are not asked to 
change existing law in any manner. Rather, since the servitude is 
being used for its traditional purpose, the court is required merely 
to recognize that pollution is in fact a burden upon navigation and 
that surveillance stations will assist in eliminating that burden. 
If a surveillance system is sought to be established under existing 
law, however, it will be difficult to demonstrate a legislative purpose 
to aid navigation, for the federal pollution control laws, although 
designed to eliminate water pollution, do not reflect an interest on 
the part of Congress to assist or advance navigation.57 Consequently, 
those opposing an exercise of the servitude might reasonably argue 
that since the statutory authority for the surveillance system itself is 
not specifically designed to aid navigation, the servitude cannot 
validly be exercised in the acquisition of surveillance sites. 
Because of the difficulty confronting an argument based on the 
traditional analysis, it may be preferable to base the argument for 
application of the servitude on some other analysis. It may be pos-
sible, for example, to use a unique application of the public-trust 
approach. Under that approach, the bed of a navigable stream is 
viewed as the corpus of a public trust, such that the Government, as 
trustee, may use lands situated within that stream bed without com-
pensating private owners, so long as the use is for a public purpose 
which tends to benefit all the people of the country. The idea of 
57. For example, neither the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155 
(1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. 
IV, 1965-1968), nor its legislative history contains anything indicating an intent to 
assist navigation. Nor does the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
224, 84 Stat. 91, specifically mention navigation. The Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 43-37 (1964), originally did refer to oil dumping as a "menace to navigation" 
[43 Stat. 605, 33 U.S.C. § 433 (1964)], but when that Act was amended in 1966, the 
reference to navigation was omitted. 80 Stat. 1253, 33 U.S.C. § 433 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
Section 108 of the Water Quality Improvement Act repeals the Oil Pollution Act of 
1924 and substitutes in its place § 11 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 
Both § 11, pertaining to oil, and § 12, pertaining to other hazardous polluting 
substances, state that the harmful or potentially harmful pollutants subject to 
removal are those elements or compounds, including oil, which "present an imminent 
and substantial danger to the public health and welfare, including but not limited to, 
fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches." (Emphasis added.) Since the category 
of dangers is expressly left open, danger to navigation may or may not be included. 
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the public trust has been developed fairly extensively in some states,58 
but has received little attention under federal law. Because the 
federal government, at least in theory, exercises only delegated 
powers, the purposes for which it could exercise the public trust would 
perhaps be more limited than would the purposes for which a state 
could do so. Thus, in order to justify the exercise of its powers as 
trustee, it might be necessary for the federal government to demon-
strate that the power was exercised for the purpose of aiding such 
federally protectible interests as navigation, commerce, and fisheries. 
Under such an approach, the land necessary for surveillance sites 
below high-water levels could be acquired without compensating 
private landmvners, because the land would be intended for use in 
eliminating pollution-a public use in aid of commerce, navigation, 
and fisheries. 
The development of the "common law of the public trust," how-
ever, must be considered as being in a state of infancy, particularly 
with respect to the federal government. Moreover, the application 
suggested goes somewhat beyond the conventional public-trust the-
ory. 59 Thus, because the doctrine is not sufficiently established to 
guarantee the validity of an argument based on such a view of the 
navigation servitude, it is necessary to examine other possible theories 
for the application of the navigation servitude. 
One such approach would be to seek site acquisition on the basis 
of an expanded view of the "navigation servitude." It has been sug-
gested that because of the dominant interest of the United States in 
land situated within the bed of a navigable stream, such land should 
be viewed as a part of the public domain.60 Therefore, at least when 
dealing with problems related to navigation, the authority exercised 
by the Government over such land is proprietary in nature-that is, 
it is similar to the authority which the Government exercises over 
federal public lands in general, pursuant to article IV, section 3, 
of the Constitution. Under this approach it may be argued that since 
all lands situated within the bed of a navigable stream are a part 
of the public domain, and are subject to the proprietary interest of 
58. See generally Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 
(1967); Crary v. State Highway Commn., 219 Miss. 284, 68 S.2d 468 (1953). For a com-
prehensive discussion of the development of the idea of the public trust, see Sax, 
The Public-Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 471 (1970). 
59. For the most part, the public-trust doctrine is not directed toward the ac-
quisition of lands for public use; rather it consists of limitations upon what a state 
may do with the lands which it already owns. See generally Sax, supra note 58. 
60. See, e.g., Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation-Struggle 
for a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. R.Ev. I (1968). 
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the United States, they may be utilized by the Government without 
compensation to adjoining private owners. 
The difficulty with such an expanded view of the navigation 
servitude lies in the fact that, although it seems reasonable to view 
the dominant interest of the United States in the land in question as 
a segment of the public domain, the cases supporting this view of 
the servitude have all dealt solely with the question of navigation.61 
Those cases tend to support the narrow view that lands below the 
high-water mark are public lands only when the navigation authority 
of Congress is being exercised with regard to these lands. It appears, 
then, that if the lands are sought to be used by the Government 
through an exercise of some authority other than that of navigation, 
those lands cannot be considered public lands, and the taking is 
therefore subject to the compensation provisions of the fifth amend-
ment. 
The fourth and probably most reasonable theory which can be 
used in arguing that site acquisition could properly be achieved 
under the navigation servitude is based on the proposition that the 
traditional view of the navigation servitude is unnecessarily restric-
tive and has been made obsolete by subsequent developments in 
the very precepts of constitutional law upon which it was based. The 
concept of the navigation servitude grew out of the early case of 
Gibbons v. Ogden,62 in which it was held that, by virtue of the 
commerce clause, the United States has exclusive and absolute con-
trol over certain watenvays. Subsequent cases recognized that because 
of this exclusive and absolute control, the United States has an 
interest in the beds of navigable watenvays-"the navigation servi-
tude"-:which is superior to the rights of private owners.63 According 
to those early cases, the servitude exists to serve and make effective 
the power of the United States to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce; thus the servitude exists to serve commerce. That 
concept, however, reflected the relatively narrow view which those 
cases had of the scope of the commerce power of the United States. 
Beyond those transactions which were unquestionably interstate or 
foreign commerce, the commerce power extended within state lines 
only tentatively; and the reach of that power was limited to com-
61. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. 
River Rouge Improvement Co., 296 U.S. 411 (1926). 
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
63. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913). See 
also United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. River 
Rouge Improvement Co., 296 U.S. 411 (1926). 
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merce on navigable waters. The rationale for this limitation was that 
since only navigable waters could support commerce, the commerce 
power was limited to navigable waterways.64 Water was thus viewed 
merely as a conduit of commerce rather than as an article of com-
merce. It was in this context that the navigation servitude was 
developed. Because that servitude derived its character and limita-
tions from the commerce power which it was intended to effectuate, 
it was, like the commerce power, limited in its exercise to purposes 
in aid of navigation. Since the time when the navigation servitude 
was developed, however, the scope of the commerce power has been 
greatly expanded. Moreover, it is unquestionable that water itself 
has become an article of commerce rather than a mere "navigation 
conduit" and should be considered in that light.65 However sound 
its original basis, then, the historical equation of "commerce" with 
"navigation" is no longer valid; and the commerce power should 
now encompass not only navigable streams, but also all other streams 
in which the water itself may be said to be an article of interstate 
commerce. And since "commerce" and "navigation" can no longer 
be equated, the servitude cannot remain limited in its exercise to 
purposes in aid of navigation, but must expand with the commerce 
power from which it is derived. For these reasons, the navigation 
servitude should be available for use in helping to control pollution. 
The conclusion follows that the navigation servitude may be used 
to acquire surveillance sites, because those sites will be used in a 
program designed to eliminate pollution and consequently to aid 
interst,ate commerce by removing a burden on interstate waters. 
It seems likely that at least one of the foregoing approaches would 
permit the United States to acquire surveillance sites by means of 
exercising its navigation servitude. Although a substantial number 
of the necessary sites can probably be acquired in this manner, it 
may be necessary or desirable in some instances to establish surveil-
lance stations on sites which cannot be obtained through the naviga-
tion servitude. For example, sites below the high-water level on 
waters which are neither navigable nor interstate may be beyond the 
reach of the servitude, as may be sites for stations which must be 
established above the high-water level. In those cases, other means 
for acquisition must be sought. 
64. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
65. Water is now used for public water supply, irrigation, and electrical generation 
and is an article of commerce in the market place no less than guns or butter, 
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B. Establishment of Surveillance Stations on Federal Lands 
One possible way to acquire sites for surveillance stations other 
than by the exercise of the navigation servitude is to place such sta-
tions on lands which are already owned by the federal government. 
When this course is feasible, problems and costs of site acquisition 
may be greatly eased. A threshold question, however, with respect 
to whether federal lands can be used for surveillance stations, and 
indeed, with respect to whether a surveillance system as contemplated 
may be established at all, is whether the Federal Water Quality 
Administration is authorized to be a land-administering agency. 
Nothing in the applicable statutes appears to prohibit that responsi-
bility; and in certain situations, such as those involving research 
stations,66 that agency already exercises such authority. Nonetheless, 
it would be advisable to establish the land-administering authority 
of the agency through an opinion either by the Solicitor of the De-
partment of the Interior or by the Attorney General of •the United 
States. 
Assuming that there is such a land-administering authority, it 
will still be necessary, as a general procedural matter in the acquisi-
tion of federal lands for surveillance station sites, that the Federal 
Water Quality Administration secure the authorization for such use 
from the agency responsible for the administration of the lands in-
volved. While special permits may not often be required as a matter 
of law, some type of formal arrangement may nonetheless be desir-
able, because it is important that the sites be segregated from other 
uses. That segregation could be accomplished by a special permit, or 
by executive withdrawal, or by a suitable declaration prohibiting 
conflicting uses. 
There is considerable potential for using federal lands as sites 
for surveillance stations, since many of the river basins of the United 
States drain federal lands upon which stations might be located. The 
southeastern river basins, for example, encompass a number of na-
tional forests, including the Apalachicalla and Conecuh National 
Forests. The Ohio River basin drains the Allegheny, Wayne, Hoosier, 
and Shawnee National Forests. The lower Missouri River basin drains 
a wide variety of federal lands, including public lands in Colorado 
and Wyoming, national forests in Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska, 
66. See Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, § 105(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224, 
§ 105(k), 84 Stat. 91, amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466c (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), which gives the Secretary authority to 
acquire land for demonstration projects, field laboratories, and research facilities. 
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and Indian reservations in Nebraska. Indeed, nearly all of the rivers 
of the West drain federal lands of every description. In addition, 
probably all of the river basins of the United States drain federal 
water-project sites which are under the jurisdiction of either the 
Army Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation. Thus, since 
the federal government owns a great deal of land in the United 
States, it is possible that a substantial number of the necessary surveil-
lance stations may ultimately be located on federal lands. But sig-
nificant legal problems may be encountered in an attempt to establish 
surveillance stations on the various types of federal lands, and each 
category of federal landownership has its own peculiar problems 
which must be overcome. The following discussion examines the 
problems encountered in some of the more important areas of federal 
landownership. 
I. Public-Domain Lands 
The term "public-domain lands" as used in this analysis refers 
to that portion of the public domain which is under the jurisdiction 
of the Secretary of the Interior and which is administered and 
managed by the Director of the Bureau of Land Management. The 
extent of these lands, particularly in the western states, is vast; and 
in the absence of previous withdrawals or reservations, chances are 
good that such lands could be made available for surveillance stations. 
In order to establish surveillance sites on public lands, it would be 
necessary for the Secretary to withdraw the sites from entry. Such 
withdrawal may be accomplished pursuant to the Pickett Act61 or 
through the exercise of the Secretary's general authority to withdraw 
and reserve lands from entry and settlement.68 The Pickett Act grants 
the President the authority to withdraw any public lands of the 
United States and to reserve those lands for water-power sites, irriga-
tion, classification of lands, "or other public purposes to be specified 
in the orders of withdrawals .... " 69 The President has since dele-
gated that authority to the Secretary of the Interior.10 
There is little doubt that the establishment of surveillance sta-
tions is a "public purpose" as contemplated by the Pickett Act, and 
could therefore be the subject of a valid withdrawal. A withdrawal 
of lands pursuant to the Pickett Act, however, has one potential 
67. 36 Stat. 847 (1910), 43 U.S.C. §§ 141-42 (1964). 
68. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 326 U.S. 459 (1915). 
69. 43 u.s.c. § 141 (1964). 
70. Exec. Order No. 10,355, 3 C.F.R. 873 (1949-1953 comp.). 
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pitfall which should not be overlooked. Section 2 of the Act provides 
that any lands so withdrawn "shall at all times be open to explora-
tion, discovery, occupation, and purchase under the mining laws of 
the United States, so far as the same apply to metalliferous min-
erals .... "71 In many cases, such a wide range of potential entry 
may not be deemed desirable by the Secretary, and in those cases 
limited segregation of lands may be accomplished by means other 
than by use of the Pickett Act. For example, if acquisition of the 
land is preceded by a retention classification by the Secretary under 
the Classification and Multiple Use Act,72 the Secretary may provide 
in that classification that the lands be segregated from uses such as 
mineral entry.73 Alternatively, it may be possible to insulate the sur-
veillance station site from mining claims simply by seeking a with-
drawal by the Secretary pursuant to his general withdrawal author-
ity. 74 In order to initiate the withdrawal either under the Pickett Act 
or under general withdrawal powers, the Federal Water Quality 
Administration would submit an application to the Bureau of Land 
Management.75 Upon application, the lands would become segregated 
and no longer open to entry.76 I£ the Bureau of Land Management 
approved the application, it would issue a final withdrawal order.77 
2. National-Forest Lands 
Another group of federally owned lands which are attractive for 
water pollution surveillance station sites are the national forests. 
Indeed, forest lands may prove more important than public-domain 
lands as possible sites, because, unlike the public-domain lands, the 
national forests are also found in the eastern states, where both the 
problems of pollution and the cost of any private land which must 
be acquired £or sites are likely to be much greater than they are in 
the western states. 
The national-forest lands are administered by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, and their availability for use in a surveillance system 
71. 43 u.s.c. § 142 (1964). 
72. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1411-18 (1964). 
73. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(e)(l) (1969). See generally Comment, The Conservationists 
and the Public Lands: Administrative and Judicial Remedies Relating to the Use and 
Disposition of Public Lands Administered by the Department of the Interior, 68 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 1200 (1970). 
74. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1964); Exec. Order No. 10,355, 3 C.F.R. 873 (1949-1953 
comp.). See also United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
75. 43 C.F.R. § 2311.0-6 (1969). 
76. 43 C.F.R. § 2311.1-2 (1969). 
77. 43 C.F.R. § 2311.1-4 (1969). 
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is less clear than is that of the public-domain lands administered by 
the Secretary of the Interior. Research has not disclosed any con-
gressional authorization for an interdepartmental transfer or ex-
change of such lands. It still may be possible to utilize forest lands 
for surveillance sites, however, since the Secretary of Agriculture is 
authorized, within certain limits, to permit any public agency to 
use and occupy land within the national forests for the purpose of 
constructing or maintaining any buildings, structures, or facilities 
necessary or desirable for any public use.78 
It seems clear that this authorization embraces federal agencies, 
such as the Federal Water Quality Administration, in addition to 
state and local agencies. Moreover, the language seems broad enough 
to authorize the establishment of surveillance stations within the 
national forests upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture. 
As with the public-domain lands79 the possibility of mining entry 
may pose some problem, since, absent withdrawal, the national forest 
lands are open to mining entry.80 It is unclear, however, in the case 
of forests, whether the Secretary of Agriculture can condition the 
permits so as to insulate the location from mining claims after the 
establishment of the stations, for it is uncertain that he has the power 
to order that the lands be withdrawn from entry. Perhaps the Secre-
tary of the Interior could order such withdrawal.81 But whatever the 
case, such withdrawals should, if possible, be effected immediately 
upon the issuance of the permits. 
3. Bureau of Reclamation Project Sites 
It is also possible that project sites of the Bureau of Reclamation 
could be used as sites for water quality surveillance stations. The 
Bureau of Reclamation has acquired jurisdiction over certain poten-
tial reclamation project sites in the western part of the United States. 
In most instances, the reclamation project sites have been established 
by withdrawals from the public lands by the Secretary of the Interior, 
pursuant to his authority under section 3 of the Reclamation Act 
78. 38 Stat. 1101 (1915), 16 U.S.C. § 497 (1964). The area to be occupied may not 
exceed eighty acres, and the period of occupation may not exceed thirty years. In 
addition, "[t]he authority provided by this section shall be exercised in such a manner 
as not to preclude the general public from full enjoyment of the natural, scenic, 
recreational, and other aspects of the national forests." 
79. See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra. 
80. See 16 U.S.C. § 482 (1964). 
81. The Secretary of the Interior does have that authority with respect to lands 
under his administration. See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra with respect to the 
national-forest lands. 43 U.S.C. § 482 (1964) permits the Secretary to restore mineral 
lands to the public domain. 
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of 1902.82 I£ any such sites are to be used for surveillance stations, 
it would appear advisable to transfer administrative jurisdiction over 
a portion of the sites to the Federal Water Quality Administration. 
Such an intradepartmental transfer of jurisdiction could be accom-
plished by a modification of the reclamation withdrawal order,83 fol-
lowed by a new withdrawal order issued under the Secretary's gen-
eral authority to withdraw public lands.84 I£ such a formal transfer 
is not thought to be feasible, an alternative might be for the Bureau 
of Reclamation and the Federal Water Quality Administration to 
make an agreement allowing portions of the reclamation sites to be 
used for surveillance purposes.815 
4. Corps of Engineers Project Sites 
Another category of federal lands which may prove extremely use-
ful as sites for surveillance stations are the lands administered by 
the Army Corps of Engineers. These lands are particularly attractive 
in that they are located on rivers and are found throughout the 
country. Furthermore, the authority for a transfer of rights in these 
lands to the Federal Water Quality Administration is clear. The 
Secretary of the Army has broad authority to grant licenses or leases 
of water resource development lands to public agencies, without 
monetary consideration, whenever he determines such action to be 
in the public interest. In addition, he has the general power to lease 
nonexcess property within his jurisdiction.86 Consequently, few legal 
problems, if any, should be anticipated in acquiring surveillance sites 
on property under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers. The 
possibility of interdepartmental administrative difficulties still exists, 
however, and may be more troublesome than the legal questions 
involved.87 
5. General Problems with Establishing Surveillance Stations 
on Federal Lands 
In some instances, federal lands may be devoted by statute to a 
single purpose which is incompatible with the establishment and 
82. 32 Stat. 388, 43 U.S.C. § 416 (1964). 
83. 43 u.s.c. § 416 (1964). 
84. See text accompanying notes 67-77 supra. 
85. 43 u.s.c. § 387 (1964). 
86. 70A Stat. 150 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 2667 (1964). "Nonexcess property" is property 
under the control of the Secretary of the Army other than that which he has deter-
mined is not required for the needs and the discharge of the duties of the Army. See 
40 U.S.C. § 472(e) (1964). 
87. The internecine warfare between federal agencies, particularly in the annual 
appropriations battle, is legendary. 
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operation of surveillance stations on them. Examples of such single-
purpose federal areas are national parks88 and monuments,89 and 
defense or military installations.90 In such cases, unless suitable al-
ternative sites are available for surveillance activities, legislation may 
be needed to broaden the purposes for which the lands may be used. 
Of course, in adopting such legislation, Congress would have to 
balance the compatibility of surveillance stations with the purposes 
for which the lands were originally set aside. 
Without advance knowledge of the potential sites for surveillance 
stations on federal lands, it is impossible to predict the individual 
problems which may arise in each case. As a general proposition, 
however, it should be realized that mere federal ownership of a 
potential site does not guarantee that, as a practical matter, that 
site will be available for surveillance purposes; many interdepart-
mental and intradepartmental obstacles may make the acquisition 
of appropriate sites on federal lands no more feasible than is the 
acquisition of similar sites on state or private lands. Even if the 
land is available, the economic savings which may be achieved 
through use of a federal site may be offset by the costs involved in 
proceeding through the intricacies of an intragovernmental land 
transfer. Nevertheless, federal lands will frequently offer many ad-
vantages over state or private lands and should be considered care-
fully in site selection. Indeed, if their attractiveness for technological 
or scientific purposes is equal to that of alternative sites on state or 
private lands, the federal sites would probably be preferable in most 
instances, simply because they would not require funding for their 
initial acquisition. 
C. Acquisition of Surveillance Sites from States, Municipalities, 
or Private Owners 
Although a substantial portion of the necessary surveillance sites 
may be obtained either through an exercise of the navigation servi-
tude or through the use of federal lands, some acquisition of interests 
in state, local, or private lands will probably be necessary for the 
establishment of a comprehensive water quality surveillance system. 
The following discussion explores the legal problems which may 
arise in connection with the acquisition and use of such lands. 
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964). See also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852. 
89. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964). See also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852. 
90. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a, 670c (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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I. Authority of States and Municipalities To Transfer Interests 
in Land 
An initial problem in acquiring sites from states or municipalities 
concerns the authority of those states or municipalities to transfer to 
the United States the real property for the sites. Rights which the 
federal government might acquire in that property include fee-
simple title, lease, permanent or temporary easement, or license. 
Because it is essential, if the station is to operate indefinitely, that 
the interest which is to be acquired for the establishment of that 
station be a relatively substantial and permanent one, the authority 
to grant licenses, which are generally revocable at will, need not be 
considered. Instead, the real question concerns the authority of states 
and municipalities to transfer legal interests which are at least as 
substantial as a temporary easement. 
Because the authority held by the states and municipalities which 
own potential surveillance sites is certain to be subject to a multi-
plicity of local laws, a universally applicable answer to that question 
is not possible. Moreover, because of the sheer number of states and 
municipalities owning land in the river basins of the United States, 
a definitive answer for each particular situation is impossible. For 
present purposes, however, it will suffice to state that, as a general 
rule, states and municipalities do possess the authority to grant 
legal interests in the real property which they own.91 
Initially, the acquisition of sites from state or local governments 
will require that federal officials consult with the officials responsible 
for the management of those areas. In the case of state governments, 
the state water pollution control agency or the park commission is 
91. The following provisions are representative of state statutes granting authority 
to the federal government for the acquisition of state or private lands: Colorado: The 
State of Colorado authorizes the State Board of Land Commissioners to sell any state 
land in such parcels as the Board shall deem for the best interests of the state. CoLo. 
R.Ev. STAT. § 112-3-25 (1963). See also COLO. R.Ev. STAT. § 66-28-3 (Supp. 1967). Florida: 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 6.02 (1961) (emphasis added) provides: 
The United States may purchase, acquire, hold, own, occupy and possess such 
lands within the limits of this state as they shall seek to occupy and hold as sites 
on which to erect and maintain forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other 
needful buildings, or any of them, as contemplated and provided in the con-
stitution of the United States; such land to be acquired either by contract with 
owners, or in the manner hereinafter provided. 
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 6.03 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 589.10 (1962). Tennessee: The 
State of Tennessee authorizes the United States to acquire such lands as in the opinion 
of the federal government, the State Forester, and the Governor may be necessary for 
such projects as the improvement and development of the Tennessee River .Basin. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-1001 (1955). See also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1401, 12-201 (1955): 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-1416 (Supp. 1969). West Virginia: The State of West Virginia 
authorizes the United States to acquire lands in the state by purchase, lease, or con-
demnation for such purposes as constructing public improvements, or for any other 
purpose for which the United States may need the land. W. VA. CODE § 1-1-3 (1966). 
See also w. VA. CODE § 20-5A-5 (Supp. 1969). 
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often the responsible agency. Other possibilities include the state 
highway department, the state planning commission, and the state 
public utilities commission. As is the situation with respect to 
federal parklands,92 cases of potential incompatibility of uses may 
arise when surveillance sites are sought on state or municipal park-
lands.93 Unless political accommodations can be made to permit the 
establishment of the stations in such areas,94 alternative sites must 
be chosen. In all cases involving the acquisition of state-owned sites, 
the state water pollution control agency should be consulted regard-
ing the site selection and acquisition process in order to ensure the 
most efficient use of state resources.911 
2. Authority of the United States To Acquire Lands for the 
Establishment of a Surveillance System 
Assuming that there is the requisite statutory authority to estab-
lish water quality surveillance systems, 96 it will be necessary for the 
Secretary of the Interior or the Federal Water Quality Administra-
tion to acquire lands on which to locate such stations. There are at 
least four potential methods which can be used for that acquisition. 
These methods include the acceptance of sites by donation and the 
acquisition of lands by purchase, condemnation, or exchange. Yet 
the statutory authority to utilize these methods is not entirely clear. 
a. Acceptance of sites by donation. Existing law apparently does 
provide for the acceptance of donations of sites for water quality 
surveillance. There is a general statutory authority for the Secretary 
of the Interior to "accept contributions or donations of ... property, 
real, personal, or mixed, for the improvement, management, use, and 
protection of the public lands and their resources under his jurisdic-
92. See text accompanying note 88 supra. 
93. There may be statutory restrictions on the uses which may be made of those 
lands. See, e.g., ARiz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 41-511.03 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 10-21.4 
(Supp. 1968). 
94. Accommodations must be made with the state agencies responsible for park-
lands, and, if statutory restrictions are involved, with the state legislators as well. In 
some instances, even the state legislature may be restricted in what it can do with the 
state parklands. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commn., 350 Mass. 410, 215 
N.E.2d 114 (1966). See generally Sax, supra note 58, at 493-502. 
95. Such consultation with state pollution control officials is desirable and perhaps 
necessary even when the lands are sought to be acquired from municipalities. Although 
municipalities generally have sufficient authority to grant easements and permits re• 
specting municipally owned land, in some instances state control may restrict local 
authority. For example, if a state pollution control agency holds powers respecting 
the use of state waterways, a municipality may be subject to those restrictions. In any 
event, because of the need for cooperation .in pollution control with state officials, it 
is desirable to consult the state pollution control agency in any such land acquisition. 
96. See text accompanying notes 19-37 supra. 
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tion .... "97 That statute has been administratively interpreted to 
authorize the Secretary to accept sites for water research laboratories 
which are provided for in the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act.98 Under this administrative interpretation, it is not necessary 
that the acquisition become part of the public lands, "but only that 
it will be beneficial in the 'improvement, management, use, and pro-
tection of the public lands' ";99 and since the conservation and devel-
opment of water resources is directly related to the development and 
use of the public lands, "it is within the jurisdiction of the Secretary 
of the Interior to accept the donation of land."100 
Since establishment of a water pollution research facility has 
thus been found to have enough impact upon the "improvement, 
management, use, and protection of the public lands and their 
resources . . ." to permit the Secretary to accept donations of land 
for that purpose, it seems to follow, although there has been no specific 
administrative ruling on the question, that the Secretary should sim-
ilarly be permitted to accept donations for water quality surveillance 
stations for monitoring the flow of waters arising on, or related to, 
the public lands. At the very least, then, there seems to be adequate 
authority for the Secretary to accept donations of sites for surveillance 
stations which would monitor pollution directly affecting the public 
lands. 
In addition, a strong argument can be made that the Secretary of 
the Interior is empowered to accept donations of sites which are not 
on waters directly affecting the public lands. The research develop-
ments generated by surveillance stations and equipment, wherever 
located, will be of ultimate benefit to all the water resources of the 
nation, including those on the public lands. Moreover, to the extent 
that adequate enforcement of water quality standards depends upon 
the existence of a comprehensive system of monitoring stations, it 
can be argued that the benefit which will accrue to the public lands 
from the control of water pollution will be much greater if such a 
comprehensive system of stations is established than if stations are 
established only in direct proximity to public lands. 
97. 74 Stat. 506 (1960), 43 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1964). 
98. Memorandum from Associate Solicitor for Water Resources and Procurement, 
Department of the Interior, to the Assistant Commissioner for Administration, Federal 
Water Pollution Control Administration, Nov. 5, 1968. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(e) (1964) au-
thorizes "research, investigations, experiments, field demonstrations and studies, and 
training relating to the prevention and control of water pollution." 
99. Memorandum from Associate Solicitor for Water Resources and Procurement, 
Department of the Interior, to the Assistant Commissioner for Administration, Federal 
Water Pollution Control Administration, Nov. 5, 1968. 
100. Id. 
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It might be objected that such a position stretches the authority 
vested by the statute beyond its contemplated limits. However, un-
like earlier statutory provisions authorizing the Secretary to accept 
donations,1°1 the provision in question here was enacted as a general 
authorizing provision, and a broad interpretation is supported by 
the other provisions of the same Act.102 Hence, it does not appear 
that further specific legislative authority is necessary to empower the 
Secretary of the Interior to accept donations of property for general 
purposes relating to the control of water pollution. Nevertheless, if 
for other reasons legislative action is necessary in order to establish 
a surveillance system,103 whatever uncertainty does exist with respect 
to the Secretary's authority to accept donations could be alleviated 
by the inclusion of specific authority in such legislation. 
b. Acquisition of sites by exchange. Another means by which 
possible surveillance sites could be acquired is exchange. It appears 
that it would be possible, particularly in the western states, for the 
Secretary to acquire surveillance sites by exchanging public lands 
under his jurisdiction. The Taylor Grazing Act104 confers broad 
authority upon the Secretary to make such transfers when he finds 
that the "public interests will be benefited."105 Presumably, if the 
Secretary were to find that the public interest would be benefited by 
the establishment of surveillance stations on certain tracts of private 
land, his authority to acquire those private lands through exchange 
would be clear. The statute, and others of similar effect,106 are of 
101. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 36b (1964) (acceptance of lands by Geological Survey); 
43 U.S.C. § 315h (1964) (acceptance of lands for grazing districts); 43 U.S.C. § 1102e 
(1964) (acceptance of property to further management of reconveyed Indian lands in 
Oklahoma). 
102. Pub. L. No. 86-649, 74 Stat. 506 (1960), of which the provision referred to is a 
part, also grants to the Secretary the general authority to conduct studies, investiga-
tions, and experiments with respect to the improvement, management, use, and pro-
tection of public lands and their resources and to enter into cooperative agreements for 
those purposes, so long as such agreements are not expressly prohibited. See 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1362-63 (1964). A broad interpretation of the Secretary's authority to accept dona-
tions is also supported by the express provision that the statute is not meant to limit 
or repeal any previously existing statutory authority empowering the Secretary to 
accept contributions or donations. 43 U.S.C. § 1364(b) (1964). 
103. See note 40 supra and accompanying te.xt. 
104. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-15g, 315h-15m, 315n, 3150-l (1964). 
105. 48 Stat. 1272 (1934), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315g (1964). 
106. See generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 315m-l to 315m-4 (1964) (Taylor Grazing Act of 
1938); 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) (National Wildlife Refuge System); 
16 U.S.C. § 555a (1964) (exchange of lands under the jurisdiction of the Forest Ser-
vice); 7 U.S.C. § lOll(f) (1964) (authority of Secretary of Agriculture to deal with 
lands acquired for land conservation and land utilization); 16 U.S.C. § 485 (1964) 
(exchange of lands in national forests); 16 U.S.C. § 569 (1964) (donations of lands to 
the United States for timber purposes); 16 U.S.C. §§ 513-19 (1964) (purchase and ex-
change of lands for national forests); 16 U.S.C. § 663(c) (1964) (acquisition of lands 
for the conservation of wildlife resources). 
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somewhat limited application, however, since they are applicable 
only under certain statutory conditions. Moreover, because of 
the restrictions upon the types of lands which may be exchanged,107 
and because the lands which may be desirable for an exchange may 
have already been committed to a particular use for the immediate 
future,108 the practical availability of this power of the Secretary 
may be further diminished. 
c. Acquisition of sites by purchase or condemnation. The stat-
utory authority for the purchase or condemnation of property for 
surveillance sites is much more tenuous than is that for the exchange 
of property or for the acceptance of donated property. The Secretary 
of the Interior does not have general legislative authority for the 
purchase of real property; instead, such authority must be set out 
by statute for each specific purchase.109 Thus, although the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act110 authorizes the Secretary to "establish, 
equip, and maintain field laboratory and research facilities" in cer-
tain designated areas of the country and in other areas as he may see 
fit,111 and although such authority may subsume the authority to pur-
chase lands for the specific facilities enumerated in the section,112 it 
is unlikely that the authority would extend to the purchase of sites 
for surveillance stations, because such stations are not mentioned in 
the statute.113 
A second possibility for the requisite authority is found in the 
statute authorizing the Secretary to acquire lands for "gaging streams 
107. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 315g(b) (1964), which provides that the Secretary in ex-
change for the private lands acquired, may "issue patent for not to exceed an equal 
value of surveyed grazing district land or of unreserved surveyed public land in the 
same State or within a distance of not more than fifty miles within the adjoining State 
nearest the base lands." 
108. There may be some question, for example, whether the Secretary may transfer 
a fee interest in grazing land if that land is currently being used under a grazing 
permit. Grazing permits have been held to create actionable rights in the holder, and 
some statutes confer preferential rights to such permits on owners of contiguous land. 
Moreover, if the land has been classified under 43 U.S.C. § 1411 (1964) for retention 
in public ownership for a use which is not consistent with private ownership (such 
as wilderness preservation), there may be an additional impediment to effecting site 
acquisition by the transfer method. 
109. See 41 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). 
110. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), as amended, National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, Water Quality Improvement 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. 
111. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(e) (1964). 
112. See 22 OP. AITY. GEN. 665 (1889). 
113. Indeed, the Office of Solicitor concluded that "[t]he Secretary of the Interior 
does not have authority to acquire real property for purpose of his functions and 
responsibilities under the Federal ·water Pollution Control Act •••• " Memorandum 
of Assistant Solicitor, Water Pollution Control, Department of the Interior, March 10, 
1967. However, the ·water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 has removed that restric-
tion. See text accompanying note 118 infra. 
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and underground water resources."114 Under that statute, the Secre-
tary may acquire lands for use by the Geological Survey by donation, 
purchase, or by condemnation; but he may do so only when funds 
have been specifically appropriated by Congress. Whether that stat-
ute can be construed to permit the acquisition of sites for water 
quality surveillance depends initially upon whether "gaging" used 
in the statute includes the measurement of water quality or whether 
it is limited to the determination of the amount of water volume and 
flow. The legislative history of the statute clearly indicates that the 
sites are to be used by the Geological Survey in its activities relating 
to the measurement of streamflow and water supply.115 Nothing in 
the language of the statute or in its legislative history, however, indi-
cates that the authority is broad enough to empower the Secretary to 
acquire lands for water quality surveillance sites. Even if the statute 
does envisage measurement of water quality as well as quantity, the 
question remains whether the language "for use by the Geological 
Survey" precludes the acquisition of sites for use in a surveillance 
system to be administered by the Federal Water Quality Administra-
tion. The answer appears to be that such acquisition is precluded. 
Serious problems would inevitably arise in the appropriations pro-
cess in Congress if the Federal Water Quality Administration were 
to acquire lands under the statute authorizing acquisition for the 
Geological Survey. It is not likely that Congress would appropriate 
funds for site acquisition by the Geological Survey, if it knew that 
the sites would in fact be used by, or transferred to, the Federal 
Water Quality Administration. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the 
Geological Survey itself would be willing to seek and disburse appro-
priated funds in order to provide surveillance sites for another federal 
agency in the Department of the Interior. The foregoing considera-
tions suggest that it would not be possible for the Secretary to acquire 
lands under the Geological Survey Statute for use as surveillance 
sites; indeed, the Office of the Solicitor has held that in general 
"[t]he Secretary of the Interior does not have authority to acquire 
real property for purpose of his functional responsibilities under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act .... "116 It is less clear, how-
ever, whether the statute precludes the concurrent use of the lands 
by the Geological Survey and the Water Quality Administration. 
114. 56 Stat. 1086 (1942), 43 U.S.C. § 36b (1964). 
115. See H.R. REP. No. 1847, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), and the transmittal letter 
of the Department of the Interior contained in that report. 
116. Memorandum of Assistant Solicitor, Water Pollution Control, Department of 
the Interior, March 10, 1967. 
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Surely sites acquired under this statute and used by the Geological 
Survey could not be used concurrently for such federal purposes as 
military activities by the Department of Defense or housing by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. But, the same 
logic does not necessarily apply to a joint use by the Federal Water 
Quality Administration, since the use of the sites by that Administra-
tion would be similar to the stream-gaging functions performed by 
the Geological Survey. Moreover, although Congress' specific require-
ment that the sites be used by the Geological Survey appears to pre-
clude an intradepartmental transfer of jurisdiction to the Federal 
Water Quality Administration, Congress has not precluded inter-
agency cooperation not involving an intradepartmental transfer of 
functions; and even though it may not be possible for the Secretary 
to acquire surveillance sites under the Geological Survey statute, it 
may well be possible to utilize existing Geological Survey sites within 
a general system of water quality surveillance. Apparently some steps 
in this direction have already been taken, for the Geological Survey 
has offered to increase its gaging activities to include the collection 
of water quality data for the Federal Water Quality Administration. 
Such an activity is merely informal and involves no intradepartmental 
transfer of functions. If this effort should prove to be successful, it 
will be a healthy initial step toward interagency cooperation in the 
establishment of a comprehensive water quality surveillance system. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that even well-developed cooperative 
efforts wtihin the Department of the Interior will not be sufficient 
to establish a complete surveillance system. Furthermore, even if it 
is possible to make full utilization of the possibilities for site acquisi-
tion by the use of the navigation servitude, by the utilization of fed-
eral lands, by donations, and by exchanges, it will probably not be 
possible to establish a complete system without some additional pro-
vision by Congress. 
D. Site Acquisition Under the Water Quality Improvement 
Act of 1970 and Recommended Legislation 
Legislation which has been enacted in the current session of Con-
gress does not appear to provide the necessary specific authority for 
the acquisition of surveillance sites. The Water Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970,117 which was signed by the President on April 3, 
1970, is an amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 
It permits the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land for certain 
117. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. 
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limited purposes by purchase with appropriated or donated funds, 
by donation, or by exchange for public lands under his jurisdiction. 
The language of the Act granting the Secretary the authority to 
acquire lands is prefaced by the words: "In carrying out the provi-
sions of this section relating to the conduct by the Secretary of dem-
onstration projects and the development of field laboratories and 
research facilities, the Secretary may acquire land .... "118 
As discussed previously, the authority to acquire sites for "field 
laboratory and research facilities" is probably not sufficient to en-
compass the acquisition of sites for surveillance stations.119 Indeed, 
at least arguably, the Secretary has for some time possessed that au-
thority.120 On the other hand, the Secretary's authority to acquire 
lands for "demonstration projects,"121 might seem to offer some assis-
tance in this regard. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act had 
previously authorized demonstration projects relating to the develop-
ment of "[i]mproved methods and procedures to identify and mea-
sure the effects of pollutants on water uses, including those pollutants 
created by new technological developments .... "122 If that language 
is broad enough to include surveillance stations, the conclusion then 
follows that the Water Quality Improvement Act, by expressly au-
thorizing the acquisition of land "[i]n carrying out ... demonstration 
projects ... ,"123 thereby authorizes the acquisition of land for the 
stations. It is unlikely, however, that this language is sufficiently en-
compassing, because the authorization relates to "demonstration pro-
jects" rather than to a complete system for surveillance and for the 
enforcement of water quality standards. Furthermore, the language 
of the Act relates to the identification and measurement of "the 
effects of pollutants on water uses" rather than the continuous sur-
veillance and monitoring of water quality itself. 
Consequently, notwithstanding the judgment of some staff mem-
bers who have worked closely with the legislation, it appears that the 
Water Quality Improvement Act does not provide the necessary au-
thority for the acquisition of sites for water quality surveillance 
facilities. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the confer-
118. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 105(2), 84 
Stat. 91. 
119. See text accompanying note 110 supra. 
120. See text accompanying notes 110-12 supra. 
121. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 105(2), 84 
Stat. 91 (1970). 
122. 43 U.S.C. § 466c(d)(B) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
123. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 105(2), 84 
Stat. 91 (1970). 
May 1970] Water Quality Surveillance 1161 
ence report which accompanies the House and Conferees' version of 
the Act makes no reference to land acquisition for purposes of sur-
veillance activities. It is therefore necessary that additional legisla-
tion be enacted not only to authorize the establishment of a water 
quality surveillance system,124 but also to provide for the acquisition 
of the necessary sites for surveillance stations. A draft of proposed 
legislation designed to achieve these objectives is set forth in the 
Appendix to this Article.125 
Ill. THE .APPLICATION OF A WATER QUALITY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM: 
THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF DATA COLLECTED 
An important purpose of an efficient water quality surveillance 
system would be to assist federal and state officials in determining 
compliance and noncompliance with water quality standards. But if 
the data are to be used directly in judicial enforcement of such stan-
dards by means of the abatement proceedings authorized under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,126 the data must be sufficient 
to meet requisite evidentiary standards. Just what those standards are 
in this area is not entirely clear. The Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act provides that if the preliminary-conference and hearing-board 
procedures have been used,127 the Court shall receive into evidence 
a transcript of both of those proceedings.128 In addition, the Act pro-
vides in section IO(c)(5) that the Court shall receive "such additional 
evidence, including that relating to the alleged violation of the 
[water quality] standards, as it deems necessary to a complete review 
of the standards and to a determination of all other issues relating 
to the alleged violation."129 In another section, the Act provides 
that the court shall receive "such further evidence as the court in 
its discretion deems proper."130 Unless the language of those latter 
124. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
125. See pp. 1165-66 infra. 
126. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), as amended, National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, ·water Quality Improvement 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. 
127. The conference and hearing board procedures need not always be utilized in 
abatement proceedings. Under 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), for ex-
ample, the only requirement for the abatement of a violation of water quality 
standards is six-months notice; the conference and hearing-board requirements are 
waived. 
128. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
129. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
130. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(h) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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two sections granting discretion to the court can be construed as 
meaning that the court may apply whatever evidentiary require-
ments it pleases-an unlikely interpretation-it would appear that 
the standards applied to such further evidence must be those of the 
usual rules of evidence. Thus it seems clear that any surveillance 
data introduced in the judicial proceeding must meet generally es-
tablished requirements for the competency of evidence produced by 
scientific instruments. 
In order to meet that burden, three requirements must be met: 
(1) the type of apparatus must be accepted as dependable for the 
purpose for which it has been used by the profession concerned in 
that branch of science or art; (2) the particular apparatus used must 
be one constructed according to an accepted type and must be in 
good condition for accurate work; and (3) the person using the ap-
paratus must be qualified by training and experience for its use.131 
To satisfy the first requirement, the offering party must show that 
the device or method used has gained general acceptance in its field 
as a trustworthy and reliable procedure.132 If the accuracy and relia-
bility of the device are notorious and well established, the judge may 
take judicial notice of this fact and no further proof is necessary.133 
But, if the equipment's accuracy and reliability are not generally 
known, it is necessary to qualify the equipment as dependable by the 
testimony of witnesses who are experts in the particular field. Be-
cause the proposed monitoring and transmission system will be novel 
in many respects, it is likely that general scientifc acceptance cannot 
be shown and that qualification by expert testimony will therefore 
be necessary. Second, it is necessary to show by expert testimony that 
the particular apparatus is constructed according to an accepted type 
and that at the time at which the data in question were collected, 
the apparatus was in good condition to perform accurate work. To 
show that the equipment was accurate at the time of use, it is gen-
erally necessary that the system have been tested for accuracy on the 
date of the charged violation.134 The third requirement-that the 
person interpreting the data be qualified for the job by training and 
experience--can be met simply by testimony demonstrating the 
training and experience of the witness. 
131. J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 450 (3d ed. 1937). 
132. Lindsay v. United States, 237 F .2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1956). 
133. See State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955). 
134. See State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955); State v. Moffitt, 100 A.2d 
778 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1953); Carrier v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951). 
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With respect to the proposed monitoring and transmission system, 
the qualification of the equipment and of its operator probably can 
be met fairly easily. However, the need to show that the equipment 
was accurate at the time at which the data were collected poses more 
difficult problems. Indeed, since the surveillance system would be 
composed of remote, unattended monitoring stations, that testing 
requirement may be difficult, if not impossible, to meet. Therefore, 
unless specific statutory authority is enacted to make surveillance data 
admissible as evidence in abatement proceedings, it may not be pos-
sible under the traditional rules of evidence to use the data collected 
as direct evidence in judicial abatement proceedings. 
Nevertheless, even if such statutory authorization is not forth-
coming, a surveillance system can still be a crucial element in the 
control of water pollution. The important research and planning 
functions served by a surveillance system would not be affected by 
the inability to use the data as direct evidence in abatement proceed-
ings. Even with respect to abatement proceedings, the use of surveil-
lance data as direct evidence is not essential. In fact, under the 
present structure of the Act, such use of the data may not be neces-
sary, at least in cases in which a conference and a hearing board are 
called prior to the initiation of abatement proceedings,135 because in 
such cases the bulk of the evidence used in the proceedings consists 
of the record developed at the administrative level136-in the investi-
gatory conference137 and before the hearing board.138 The inability 
to use the surveillance data directly in a judicial proceeding does not 
mean that this evidence cannot be used in the administrative pro-
ceeding, for the evidentiary requirements of the administrative pro-
ceeding are not necessarily the same as those of a judicial proceeding 
for abatement. Under the Administrative Procedure Act,139 it is 
clear that the evidentiary requirements are far less strict than they 
are in a judicial proceeding, particularly with respect to questions of 
hearsay and of competency of evidence.140 Thus, since the evidence 
135. But see note 127 supra. 
136. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 466g(c)(5), (h) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
137. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
138. 33 U.S.C. § 446g(f) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
139. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
140. Section 7(d), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), provides in part: 
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but every agency shall as a 
matter of policy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious evidence. A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order be issued 
except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party 
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used by the court in an abatement proceeding consists largely of the 
record of the administrative proceedings, and of the Secretary's rec-
ommendations made on the basis of the evidence received in the 
administrative proceedings, it is clear that data from a surveillance 
system may still play an important role in the enforcement of the 
water pollution control laws, at least in those cases which undergo 
administrative scrutiny prior to abatement.141 
Moreover, probably the greatest contribution which a surveil-
lance system will make toward the effective enforcement of pollution 
control laws is not in the role of providing direct evidence in either 
administrative or judicial proceedings. Rather, its greatest contribu-
tion lies in the area of the detection of pollution and polluters. Un-
doubtedly it is in the area of detection that present law and practice 
are most lacking, for there simply are no systematic procedures for 
detection. Once the Secretary has reason to suspect that a person is 
violating water quality standards, he has authority under the Act 
to require that person to disclose in a report the extent of polluting 
substances which he has discharged.142 Certainly, that procedure may 
help to gather probative evidence for an abatement proceeding, but 
its operation is predicated upon the Secretary having first detected 
the polluter and called a conference. If a surveillance system can 
fulfill the function of the initial detection, a major step will have 
been taken toward the control of water pollution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing considerations, it may be concluded 
that the establishment of a federal water quality surveillance system 
is a necessary prerequisite to the effective implementaiton of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Moreover, although there is 
no specific authorization in the existing laws for the establishment of 
a surveillance system, such authorization seems to be implicit in the 
and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial 
evidence. 
Congress, in enacting the Administrative Procedure Act, omitted from the final bill 
the requirement that evidence in administrative proceedings be "competent," although 
earlier drafts of the bill had made "competency" a requirement. Evidence may be "re• 
liable, probative, and substantial" for purposes of an administrative determination 
even though that evidence would not be "competent" in a judicial proceeding. United 
States ex rel. Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 116 F. Supp. 745, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT§ 14.05 (1959). 
141. See note 127 supra. 
142. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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general context of the Act. At the same time, however, the caveat 
should be offered that the Act is deficient in that it lacks specific 
authority for site acquisition and for the procurement of equipment. 
Consequently, the Act should be augmented by supplemental legis-
lation. 
Furthermore, in view of the fact that the existing law places upon 
state water pollution control agencies much of the initial responsi-
bility for the enforcement of water quality standards, the federal 
water pollution surveillance system should be developed in close 
cooperation with relevant state agencies and officials in order to 
minimize any duplication of facilities and surveillance activities. 
In this connection, it is suggested that any new legislation should 
clarify the relative roles of federal and state officials in the enforce-
ment and abatement process and should specifically assign responsi-




Section 10. Section 10 of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, as amended (33 U.S.C. § 466g [(1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968)]), is amended: 
(a) by redesignating sub-subsections (6) and (7) of subsection (c) 
as (8) and (9); 
(b) by inserting after sub-subsection (5) of subsection (c) two 
new sub-subsections to read as folows: 
"(6) In carrying out his duties under this section, the Secre-
tary is authorized to establish, equip, and maintain a 
water quality surveillance system for the purpose of 
monitoring the water quality of interstate waters or 
portions thereof and detecting the existence and nature 
of pollutants therein. 
"(7) The Secretary is authorized, on behalf of the United 
States and for use by the Federal Water Quality Admin-
istration in carrying out the duties under this section, 
to acquire land or interests therein and necessary access 
rights by purchase, with appropriated or donated funds, 
by condemnation, by donation, or by exchange for ac-
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quired or public lands under his jurisdiction which he 
classified as suitable for disposition. The values of the 
properties so exchanged either shall be approximately 
equal, or if they are not approximately equal, the values 
shall be equalized by the payment of cash to the grantor 
or to the Secretary as the circumstances require." 
